The second reason why I was filled with emotion when we joined the World Trade Organization’s negotiation on the automobile trade is that in the process of entering the WTO negotiations, especially on the eve of China’s accession to the WTO, people generally feel that China’s accession to the WTO has received the greatest impact. There are two industries, one is agriculture and the other is the automobile industry. At that time, many people foresaw that once China joined the World Trade Organization, the Chinese automobile industry would be severely impacted and could make China’s national automobile industry completely absent. As China's accession to the World Trade Organization’s auto issue has been extremely difficult, it has always been an important issue in terms of tariffs, non-tariffs and industrial policies. Later we realized that a high degree of protection for the Chinese automobile industry is actually not conducive to the development of the Chinese automobile industry. High tariffs and long-term maintenance of automobile import quotas have resulted in the protection of the backward Chinese auto industry. Because of restricting the import of foreign capital and limiting the investment of foreign capital in China, it has caused an ever-increasing distance between the Chinese automobile industry and the world advanced level. Very high tariff protection has actually stimulated smuggling and caused serious smuggling of Chinese cars. In 1997, at the time of negotiations on automobile tariffs, the tariff on Chinese cars was as high as 180%. The World Bank has a figure. Due to the large number of smuggling of Chinese autos and auto parts, the tariff of Chinese autos is 180%, but the actual tariff is only 26%. At that time, the U.S. negotiator stated that we are now demanding 25%. Your actual tariff is now 26%, and it is already very close. The high tariffs on automobiles have led to the smuggling of cars and smuggled cars into the “most flourishing†industry in smuggling throughout China. All this has made us profoundly aware that if we do not make concessions on such major difficulties as accession to the WTO, our auto industry will have no future, and it will prevent China from joining the history of the World Trade Organization. At that time, we made major adjustments and adjustments in our positions throughout the negotiations. Agreed to reduce the automobile tariff from 180% to 25% and draw up a timetable to abolish the quota limit for imported cars from China. Such a negotiation is also very difficult, and finally it has finally found a balance in various aspects of the World Trade Organization and China’s interests. We have made an arrangement to eliminate China’s auto import tariffs and tariffs on imported cars must have a time. The table must give China's industry a transitional period. The final agreement was that by June 2006, China’s automobile tariffs had been reduced to 25%, and the World Trade Organization, especially the United States, had requested that China’s first year of membership in the World Trade Organization be reduced to 25%, that is, it must be lowered in 2001. To 25%, not now in June 2006. At that time, China proposed that in 2008, how to reduce China's auto tariff to 25% in 2001 and 2008 did indeed have a long debate. June 2006 was put forward by Deputy Prime Minister Qian Qichen who was good at solving diplomatic problems. He said that he would take a compromise in June 2006. We have never negotiated tariffs in June, either in 2006, in 2007, or in 2005, which shows how fierce debate has been on the decline in auto tariffs. This is the only example of a monthly tariff adjustment. This point also reflects the difficulty of negotiation at that time. At that time, foreign countries proposed to stop import restrictions on the first day of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. In the end we fought until January 1, 2005, when we proposed that since the global textile quota was cancelled in January 2005, the cancellation of China’s automobile quotas was only It is available on January 1, 2005. The negotiation of the automobile industry in joining the World Trade Organization really reflects the difficulties in our negotiations on accession to the WTO.
Long Yongtu: Industrial protection is not conducive to the development of China's auto industry
The second reason why I was filled with emotion when we joined the World Trade Organization’s negotiation on the automobile trade is that in the process of entering the WTO negotiations, especially on the eve of China’s accession to the WTO, people generally feel that China’s accession to the WTO has received the greatest impact. There are two industries, one is agriculture and the other is the automobile industry. At that time, many people foresaw that once China joined the World Trade Organization, the Chinese automobile industry would be severely impacted and could make China’s national automobile industry completely absent. As China's accession to the World Trade Organization’s auto issue has been extremely difficult, it has always been an important issue in terms of tariffs, non-tariffs and industrial policies. Later we realized that a high degree of protection for the Chinese automobile industry is actually not conducive to the development of the Chinese automobile industry. High tariffs and long-term maintenance of automobile import quotas have resulted in the protection of the backward Chinese auto industry. Because of restricting the import of foreign capital and limiting the investment of foreign capital in China, it has caused an ever-increasing distance between the Chinese automobile industry and the world advanced level. Very high tariff protection has actually stimulated smuggling and caused serious smuggling of Chinese cars. In 1997, at the time of negotiations on automobile tariffs, the tariff on Chinese cars was as high as 180%. The World Bank has a figure. Due to the large number of smuggling of Chinese autos and auto parts, the tariff of Chinese autos is 180%, but the actual tariff is only 26%. At that time, the U.S. negotiator stated that we are now demanding 25%. Your actual tariff is now 26%, and it is already very close. The high tariffs on automobiles have led to the smuggling of cars and smuggled cars into the “most flourishing†industry in smuggling throughout China. All this has made us profoundly aware that if we do not make concessions on such major difficulties as accession to the WTO, our auto industry will have no future, and it will prevent China from joining the history of the World Trade Organization. At that time, we made major adjustments and adjustments in our positions throughout the negotiations. Agreed to reduce the automobile tariff from 180% to 25% and draw up a timetable to abolish the quota limit for imported cars from China. Such a negotiation is also very difficult, and finally it has finally found a balance in various aspects of the World Trade Organization and China’s interests. We have made an arrangement to eliminate China’s auto import tariffs and tariffs on imported cars must have a time. The table must give China's industry a transitional period. The final agreement was that by June 2006, China’s automobile tariffs had been reduced to 25%, and the World Trade Organization, especially the United States, had requested that China’s first year of membership in the World Trade Organization be reduced to 25%, that is, it must be lowered in 2001. To 25%, not now in June 2006. At that time, China proposed that in 2008, how to reduce China's auto tariff to 25% in 2001 and 2008 did indeed have a long debate. June 2006 was put forward by Deputy Prime Minister Qian Qichen who was good at solving diplomatic problems. He said that he would take a compromise in June 2006. We have never negotiated tariffs in June, either in 2006, in 2007, or in 2005, which shows how fierce debate has been on the decline in auto tariffs. This is the only example of a monthly tariff adjustment. This point also reflects the difficulty of negotiation at that time. At that time, foreign countries proposed to stop import restrictions on the first day of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. In the end we fought until January 1, 2005, when we proposed that since the global textile quota was cancelled in January 2005, the cancellation of China’s automobile quotas was only It is available on January 1, 2005. The negotiation of the automobile industry in joining the World Trade Organization really reflects the difficulties in our negotiations on accession to the WTO.